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Abstract   
US hegemony has been the most significant aspect of international relations since 
the fall of the Soviet Union. The past decade has seen the majority of the world 
shift under the cultural, economic and military influence of the US. This 
staggering and as yet unchecked power is in large part gained not through 
coercion but through persuasion. This ability to convince other actors in the world 
to act in a way that is beneficial to US interests is consistent with traditional 
Gramscian notions of hegemony. The content of the global media, as one of the 
primary disseminators of the hegemon's message inside civil society, should 
provide insight into the overall debate occurring within it.  Thus an examination 
of the content of the global media leading up to the recent US invasion of Iraq 
could provide some insight into the relative strength of the global hegemon. The 
results of this study clearly suggest that the US’s “power to define” is in decline 
and that the hegemon is in the midst of a crisis of authority that could be a sign of 
its irreversible decay.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There can be little argument that today’s world is one that is effectively 
dominated by one massive superpower. The United States of America is now 
responsible for more than a third of the global economy and has an unrivalled 
military, spending more on its armed forces than the next dozen countries 
combined (The Economist 2003:4). As Niall Ferguson (2003:8) recently wrote in 
Newsweek, “The United States is now an empire in all but name”.  
The US currently spends approximately 399 billion dollars per year on its 
military, nearly seven times that of Russia and 285 times larger than that of Iraq, 
the country it has invaded twice since it took on the role of the world's lone 
hegemon (CDI 2003). Economically, the US is similarly dominant as its 10.4 
trillion dollar economy constitutes more than 32% of the world’s GDP (World 
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Bank 2003). In fact, the US economy is roughly the same size as the rest of the 
G7 countries combined, and excluding those G7 countries, it is about the same 
size as the rest of the world’s economies collectively (Hofstra 2002). Politically, 
this dominance is seen in the leading role the US has taken in all realms of 
international relations, from brokering the Israeli/Palestinian peace process to 
effectively undermining the credibility of the International Criminal Court and the 
Kyoto accord by simply opposing them. In addition to this, the US is a veto-
wielding member of the Security Council and at the head of virtually every other 
significant international military or economic body from the WTO to NATO.  
Most significant for the purposes of this paper is the US’s dominance in the realm 
of culture and specifically the institutions that govern the global dissemination of 
information.  American, along with British companies, are the primary provider of 
films, music, television programming and most importantly news for the entire 
world (Magder 2003:31). In fact, in 2003 CNN alone reached more than 150 
million homes in 212 countries around the world (Thussu 2003:118).  
However, the pre-eminent position that the US now occupies, economically, 
militarily and politically around the world has its origins in the collapse of the 
Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War. Since the demise of the world’s only 
other superpower and the US’s main ideological rival, global public opinion has 
shifted towards the inherent “rightness” of the US worldview. It was generally 
believed by lesser developed nations that the way to success and prosperity was to 
emulate the US system and take an active role in the globalisation process.  As the 
US’s National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice (2003:104) recently described 
the situation, “Nations around the world share a broad commitment to democracy, 
the rule of law, a market-based economy and open trade”.  
In effect this shift meant that the majority of the world now agreed on how 
development could best be achieved. So in essence the US had not only won the 
Cold War but had in fact won over the hearts and minds of a great many of the 
world’s people and governments and created a globally shared world view.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the 
alliance of markets and foreign policy seemed triumphant. ‘Globalisation’ 
was on everyone’s lips. The American vision would spread – though 
perhaps slowly – everywhere as more nations fell under its sway 
(Samuelson 2003:44). 
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In reality, it is the fact that so much of the world gravitated towards this American 
world view, that has largely given the world’s only superpower its strength over 
the last fifteen years. It was believed that by adopting capitalist-market 
economies, liberal democracy and principles of free trade, the “have-nots” of the 
world would one day be able to join the “haves” as developed nations (Ibid). This 
“Washington Consensus” was largely believed to be the most fortuitous and 
expedient path to development and in turn impacted the soft power that the US 
held. 
This power that the US is now largely thought to wield, in all areas of global-
international relations, was described by Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci as 
hegemony. Gramsci defines hegemony as the “process of moral, philosophical, 
and political leadership that a social group attains only with the active consent of 
other important social groups” (Artz & Murphy 2003:1).  In this way, a 
hegemonic class,2 (in this case the United States) by owning and controlling the 
means of production and capital, including mental production in the form of the 
media,3 are able to support their hegemonic position. Traditionally, hegemonic 
classes are thought of as a part of the state level of analysis. However, for the 
purposes of this discussion hegemony will be examined on the macro or 
international level, and in this scenario, it is the US that occupies the position of 
hegemonic elite.  
From a Gramscian perspective, real power is not achieved through the use of 
coercive force but rather through convincing the world to see things the way the 
hegemon wants them to, thereby creating a shared “common sense” (Hallin 1994: 
59).  It is this shared common sense that led most of the developing nations of the 
world to follow Washington's advice in many areas of economic development and 
has also contributed greatly to the “real” as well as “soft” power that the US has 
enjoyed in recent years.     
 
2 At this point it is necessary to briefly discuss and define the concept of class that will be 
operationalised throughout this paper. While it may be true that the traditional class struggle defined 
by Marx may be obsolete in the classic bourgeois, proletariat sense, it can still be said that the world is 
made up of a group that has power and several other groups that have that power impressed upon 
them. It is this situation consisting of a hierarchical strata of power that we speak of when we talk of 
ruling or elite classes and subservient classes throughout this paper. 
3 Throughout this paper the term “media” will be used as a singular noun defined by the Oxford 
Dictionary 5th Edition (1995:727) as “The main means of communicating with large numbers of 
people, especially television, radio and newspapers”.  
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The adoption of this American common sense by the majority of the world has 
allowed the US to use more than just its military or economic superiority to 
achieve its current position as the world’s most powerful nation. It has allowed 
them to use the proverbial carrot more often than the stick when attempting to get 
their way in international relations. However, this system can last only as long as 
the audience that is subjected to it agrees to buy into the worldview that they are 
handed. And for this to happen, they must believe that either the system is 
benefiting them or that they have no choice. Change inside this system can occur 
only when the dominant worldview of the hegemonic elites (in this case the US) 
begins to break down. This ability to convince others to do as the hegemon desires 
without coercion is possibly the most significant aspect of US power.  
It is argued that one of the ways that the US is able to create this shared world 
view, and maintain its status as global hegemon, is through the use of the 
Western-based global media system. Most of the world’s information flows from 
the US outward and this propagation of Western based ideas throughout the world 
is one of the most powerful ways of Americanising global public opinion (Magder 
2003:31).  This is a system which, when functioning properly, can give the US the 
unprecedented power to make other global actors think that their interests and 
those of the hegemon are one in the same. This is hegemonic leadership as 
expressed by Lee Artz (2003, p.16-17): 
Leadership only becomes hegemonic because they convince others to 
become allies through persuasive political and cultural practices, which 
necessarily require normalized interpretations best communicated to the 
masses via the media. Hence, capitalist hegemony needs parallel media 
hegemony as an institutionalised, systematic means of educating, 
persuading, and representing subordinate classes to particular cultural 
practices within the context of capitalist norms. If culture is the 
ideological cement of society, then, to secure corporate interests, 
capitalist globalisation needs media hegemony to recruit, tame, and 
popularise interpretations, information and cultural behaviour 
complementary to deregulation, privatisation, and commercialisation.  
In other words, the global media system is one of the most powerful ways that the 
US maintains its control of global power through the creation of shared ideas and 
goals. It is this media system that serves as one of the greatest tools inside the 
hegemonic process as outlined by Gramsci (1971:177-185). 
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It is important to note here that truly hegemonic leadership also presupposes a 
claim by the hegemon that they are in effect acting in the interest of everyone. 
Based on our earlier assumption that the US is the world’s dominant hegemon, 
this begs the question of whether or not the US is claiming to act in the interest of 
all the subservient groups it controls.  In other words, does the US, at least 
outwardly, assume to act in the interests of all the nations in the world? The 
rhetoric of US President George W. Bush as he recently addressed the National 
Endowment for Democracy at the US Chamber of Commerce would seem to 
suggest that the answer to this question is a resounding yes. In his statement, 
where he justifies the invasion of Iraq, Bush expresses how the US is framing its 
actions as beneficial for the world as a whole.  
In fact, the prosperity, and social vitality and technological progress of 
a people are directly determined by extent of their liberty. Freedom 
honours and unleashes human creativity -- and creativity determines the 
strength and wealth of nations. Liberty is both the plan of Heaven for 
humanity, and the best hope for progress here on Earth (Bush 2003). 
This is not to say that these actions are in the best interest of the other actors in the 
world, but it does suggest that this is how the US is attempting to sell these 
actions to the global community. Therefore, the US would certainly fit the 
traditional notion of a hegemonic group, which uses institutions such as the 
media, and occasionally compromises some aspects of control, to make the 
subordinate classes feel the system is working to their advantage. 
However, some chinks may be starting to appear in this US-led global hegemony. 
Politically, the world’s only superpower appears to be becoming less and less 
influential in the world’s “soft power” game, which simply stated, is the ability to 
make people do what you want without using force (Magder 2003:30-32). This 
apparent weakness can be seen in the US’s failure to convince the world that its 
recent invasion of Iraq was justified, and in its apparent inability to peacefully 
rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan (Ferguson 2003:11). These difficulties point to a 
serious weakness in the perceived supremacy of the US military while similar 
failures in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process point to a possible weakening of 
the US’s ability to effectively use “soft power” to achieve their policy objectives. 
In addition to this, a seemingly softened US stance when dealing with so called 
rogue states like North Korea, Syria and Iran seems to be emerging, which could 
also point to a perceived loss of power. 
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…gone is the tough talk toward Syria. On Iran, too, the administration 
has increasingly deferred to the United Nations and international 
Atomic Energy Agency. Even on North Korea, Bush has softened his 
adamant refusal to negotiate any kind of deal before Pyong-Yang gives 
up its nuclear program (Hirsh 2003: 34).  
Economically, there also appear to be signs of weakness in the hegemon. Some 
analysts have suggested that a sinking dollar and a strengthening Euro may mean 
that the US’s number one position in the global economy could one day come into 
question. Furthermore, many of the poor countries of the world that believed US-
inspired governments and economies to be the path to development success have 
been sorely disappointed. As the gap between the rich and the poor countries of 
the world continues to widen, some evidence of this failure can be found inside 
the sole remaining superpower’s vanquished Cold War foe: “As for Eastern 
Europe and Russia - the formerly second world - shock-therapy privatisation 
directed by Harvard-educated economists has brought a ‘total economic 
collapse’” (Kagarlitsky 1997:19). The result of this collapse has been that more 
than ten times as many children in this region now live in poverty than while 
under Soviet rule and the “reasonable” standard of living that could be expected 
under the former Soviet government has now disappeared (European Children’s 
Trust 2000:14). Signs of dissenting voices can also be seen in the growing anti-
globalisation movements that have caused a stir at WTO meetings in Seattle and 
Quebec City in recent years as well as in the emergence of the G21 inside the 
WTO and the defection of traditional Western allies.  
These examples could be seen as a realization that US power is finite and that the 
empire is overextended (Hirsh 2003:34). It seems at least possible that certain 
segments of the world are beginning to reject the US common sense that has 
dominated unchallenged for the last decade and a half.  
This possible loss of strength for the American hegemon could be perceived as a 
weakening of the persuasive power of the dominant US world view or as Sardar 
(1999) put it, a weakening of the hegemon’s “power to define” and therefore its 
hegemonic power inside global civil society.4 This last point is crucial since it is 
 
4 Throughout this paper the notion of civil society will refer to Gramsci’s definition as it pertains to the 
hegemonic process. This is defined as the area where common sense is developed through discourse 
between institutions that are somewhat autonomous from the state (e.g. media, education system, and 
churches) Global civil society will be understood to be this arena taken outside state borders (Baylis & 
Smith 2001:210). 
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discourse within this civil society that generates the consensus that gives the 
hegemon its strength. Further to this, since the media is one of the most important 
ways a hegemon defines its worldview, it is reasonable to assume that a decline in 
the relative power of the hegemon could be visible inside the global media 
construct. It is with this in mind that the basis for this article was conceived.  
In short, if the United States is the dominant hegemonic force in the world and the 
Western-based media helps to facilitate that hegemonic process and strengthen it, 
then, if systemic change is going to occur, some change in global media content 
should be identifiable. So, if the US is losing its hegemonic control and it’s 
globally accepted world view is beginning to be questioned, then this shift should 
be reflected inside civil society and therefore inside the media.  
This problem is both interesting and relevant because the current US hegemony 
has been defining what is talked about not only around the table at the Security 
Council but also around dinner tables from Philadelphia to New Delhi. That is 
because this dialogue is in some very significant ways being shaped by the 
Western-based media from which it often emanates. So, if this conversation, and 
the terms it is being discussed in, is created by the West, it is likely leaving out the 
interests of those in the Eastern and Southern reaches of the globe.  This is 
particularly relevant given world events following September 11th 2001, as the 
US and its “Coalition of the Willing” have since effectively conducted diplomacy 
via the barrel of a gun, despite a general global consensus that these actions were 
wrong.  
The general purpose of this article is to apply Gramsci’s hegemonic theory to an 
empirical analysis of media content leading up to the recent invasion of Iraq. Due 
to the fact that the media is an integral part of the public sphere, it is assumed that 
a greater understanding of the current dialogue going on in civil society can be 
achieved through this process. It is hoped that a comparative analysis of the media 
prior to the recent invasion of Iraq could allow for some speculation about the 
health of US global hegemony when compared with similar studies of the media 
prior to the first Gulf War. 
 
GLOBAL MEDIA AND GLOBAL HEGEMONY 
The media is a major player in the creation and dissemination of the hegemon’s 
worldview. Therefore, if the media is failing to adequately relay the hegemon’s 
message then this could provide an indication that the hegemon’s real power is in 
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decline. This could then provide an indication that the circumstances for the 
potential defection of “historic blocs” and the creation of a counterhegemonic 
movement are in fact in existence. Antonio Gramsci spoke about the need for 
historical blocs to come together in order to create a hegemonic or 
counterhegemonic force (although he never specifically used the latter term). This 
article will analyse the role of global media in this hegemonic process and see if 
there is in fact the potential for a counterhegemony to emerge through opposing 
historic blocs. This question will be addressed methodologically through an 
analysis of the global media through the critical lens of hegemonic theory.  
It is often argued in the analysis of hegemonic theory that the media is an 
institution used by elites to exercise their hegemonic power. According to Thomas 
Gitlin “the mass media produce fields of definition and association, symbol and 
rhetoric, through which ideology becomes manifest and concrete” (1980:2-3). It 
can be extrapolated from this that forces of counterhegemony could also utilize 
the media in this fashion. If this is the case, signs of an emerging 
counterhegemony could be spotted by searching for elements of a rejection of the 
dominant power and its message inside the global mass media construct.  
The analysis of differing forms of media and how they react to and report on 
certain events, can provide a number of insights into how this institution is 
manipulated by powerful elites, as they attempt to control or “spin” public 
perception. Ciaran McCullough expresses this relationship between media and its 
reliance on ruling elites in his book Media Power: “…certain groups in society are 
recognized by the media as accredited sources, and as such they have privileged 
access to (and greater claims on) media coverage. Their access comes from their 
institutional power, their representative status, or their claims to expert 
knowledge” (McCullough 2002:68). 
In other words the media is constructed in such a way that it is more apt to follow 
the lead of “legitimate” elites than of dissenting voices. This is not to say that 
there is not debate within the elite class. However, there are certain underlying 
principles that are consistent within the elite class and it is these similarities that 
make up the core of the elite’s worldview. For example, there may be debate 
inside the elite class about how best to spread liberal capitalism and democracy 
around the world, but there is no debate about whether or not it should in fact be 
disseminated. In other words, there is no “macro” argument about the validity of 
the liberal capitalist system, even if there is an ongoing “micro” debate about how 
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it is to be implemented. Thus the overriding message that is transmitted to the 
media by the elite class remains the same.  
This relationship, arguably stemming from the economic and cultural framework 
around the media (Herman & McChessney 1997), makes the analysis of media a 
key component when examining hegemony in the twenty-first century. It suggests 
that media content can often reflect the ideas and positions of hegemonic elites 
rather than of the many differing viewpoints inside global civil society. 
Having said this, it was determined that an analysis of the content of certain 
players in the global media system could shine a critical light on this hegemonic 
process. As a time frame for this study we chose the week leading up to the most 
recent conflict in Iraq. This time line was selected for two primary reasons. First, 
it allowed for an examination of a case where the world’s primary hegemonic 
power was attempting to set limits and define the context of global debate about a 
single issue. Second, in 1991 there was a similar military conflict in Iraq that 
could be cross-referenced in relation to the relative growing or shrinking of the 
hegemonic entity’s power to define (Sardar 1999:44; McCullagh 2002:15) . 
Of course these two instances are not identical. The 1991 conflict was backed by a 
UN resolution and involved an Iraqi invasion of a sovereign nation. This 
difference could be explained by a lack of persuasive ability by the hegemon 
inside the Security Council and in the public sphere (both aspects of global civil 
society) but the fact remains that it is still a difference. However, there are 
certainly enough similarities to assume that some cross analysis could be useful. 
By doing this, we hoped to gain an insight into the relative control that the world’s 
primary hegemonic power, The United States of America and its allies, had during 
this period. 
For the purposes of this study seventeen daily newspapers from different regions 
of the globe as well as four major broadcast news networks (24/7) were analysed.5 
A combination of regional, political, and circulation/penetration considerations 
 
5 Empirical sources from the US were: USA Today, International Herald Tribune, CNN, and Fox 
News.  Sources from the UK were: BBC Online, The Guardian, and the Independent.  Sources from 
Australia were: The Australian, and Canberra Times.  Sources from Asia and Africa were: Izvestia 
(Russia), The Hindu (India), The People’s Daily (China), The Daily Yomiuri (Japan), Arab News 
(Saudi Arabia), Al-Jazeera Network (Qatar), and The African Times (South Africa).  Sources from the 
Americas were: Toronto Star (Canada), and The Buenos Aires Herald (Argentina).  Sources from 
Europe were: Le Monde (France), FAZ (Germany) and Politiken (Denmark).  All sources were 
examined for the period March 13-19, 2003.   
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were used to determine the sample, which included at least one paper from six of 
the world’s continents and incorporated the use of five languages and more than 
five hundred individual samples. 
The concept of framing was central to our analysis of the content of these media 
outlets and requires further explanation at this point. Our analysis was based on 
the framing theory outlined by Robert Entman (1991). Entman says frames 
construct meaning in communication messages (articles and TV news stories) by 
asking four basic questions:  
  1) What is the problem that is being reported on?  
  2) What is the cause of the problem?  
3) Who is to blame or praise?  
  4) What is to be done or what is going to happen?  
 
Framing works by using language to send the reader or viewer a specific message 
and “[t]he use of particular words to describe events and issues represents not 
merely the choice of a descriptive phrase but also the choice of an attitude towards 
the event or issue” (McCullagh 2002:23). Some examples of words or phrases 
found in this analysis that can be considered frame markers are “dictator” (in 
reference to President Saddam Hussein), “defiant” (in reference to actors) or 
“collateral damage” as a euphemism for civilian casualties. It is the inherent 
meaning of these “loaded” terms that helps to send a specific message to the 
reader/viewer of a story. This message can often carry significantly different 
meanings based on the language it uses. For example, the US administration 
would much rather see a debate about the human costs of conflict framed in terms 
of “collateral damage” rather than in terms of the number of “dead women and 
children”. This is how the story is framed or in media-speak, it is the “spin” that 
the content has been given. In this way, the media does not tell people precisely 
what to think but does tell them what to think about and through loaded language 
provides a rough ‘frame’ for that debate. 
This concept of framing means that the media works as a tool to get a given 
agent’s message across to an audience. This analysis consisted of a careful 
reading of the selected articles covering the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq on 
March 19, 2003, followed by an identification of the ‘frames’ they contained.  
This question of framing will be addressed by answering the four questions 
outlined by Entman and listed above.  Operationally, for the purpose of this study 
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we have listed ten categories6 that answer Entman's first question: what is the 
problem. This choice was justified by the fact that our categories were generally 
taken from Wilhelm Kempf's analysis of the media during the first Gulf War 
(Kempf 1996:2-10).  Therefore, this choice would provide a fairly consistent 
framework for a comparison and cross-referencing of these two somewhat similar 
events. 
Today’s current environment sees one hegemonic power, the US, often working 
to control or frame the way the entire world talks about and views certain issues. 
Of course it is an over-simplification to say that there is one simple and overriding 
ideology operating within the United States. There are a number of variations on 
the basic principles that encompass the American worldview. In this sense the US 
is a pluralist nation with a wide variety of views on how to tackle the specific 
micro problems that it encounters.  
However, on a purely macro level there can be no doubt that in the international 
arena the US acts as a unitary actor displaying one set of concrete core 
assumptions and beliefs. These include an unwavering support for the general 
pillars of liberal democracy, capitalist free market economies and transparent and 
democratically elected governments. In other words, agents inside the US may 
argue how it is best to spread these concepts throughout the world but they rarely, 
if ever, question the actual validity of these core ideas (at least not significantly). 
One example of this agenda is that “[a] global media culture is likely to embody 
many western capitalist values such as the free market, consumerism, 
individualism and commercialism” (Jones & Jones 1999:225-232). 
Those values, based on core assumptions and beliefs, may not be the same ones 
shared in every country, but since “[m]ore and more people across the globe are 
receiving the same message from the same centre of commercial power” (Ibid), 
the global community is subjected to and influenced by those values and beliefs. 
 
6 The ten categories, based roughly on the previous study done by Kempf (1996), are: (1) weapons of 
mass destruction; (2) effectiveness of the UN, focussing specifically on discussions in the security 
council; (3) US unilateralism and/or imperialistic actions; (4) the global economy and the impact of a 
potential conflict on it; (5) domestic spin, that is, the political or economic impacts an invasion would 
have for individual states; (6) “war on terrorism” and its relationship to Iraq, including articles 
mentioning 9/11 or Al-Queda link to Iraq; (7) coalition building, specifically regarding a second UN 
resolution or the debate over the validity of an invasion; (8) technical or logistical aspects of war; (9) 
human rights and potential suffering resulting from an invasion; and (10) miscellaneous or other 
themes.  Note that while many categories may have been mentioned inside any given article, the cause 
was attributed to the category referred to most prominently throughout the text. 
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In other words, state boundaries are becoming more and more porous and 
vulnerable to the ideas and symbols of the information providers, making them 
much less culturally self-contained (Webster 2003:59). This shift in how 
worldviews are created and disseminated has been assessed by some as: 
The universal mode of address may be achieved through a dilution of 
values from a specific culture (often a Western, middle class mode of 
talking such as CNN) and a unique form of address may be achieved 
through a specific combination of universally acceptable symbols…. 
Thus, global media are capable of bridging the gap between the 
universal and the specific, although they often do so by using a 
somewhat artificial format (Stald & Tufte 2002:83).   
Therefore, understanding the way this international media system works now 
carries even greater significance when attempting to understand power and 
hegemony in a global context. 
Pragmatically speaking, there can be no doubt that the majority of what we call 
global media is based in the West and more specifically in the United States. 
“Western countries predominate in the flow of news and information…and of the 
Western countries, the United States is easily the most dominant entity in every 
facet of the world communication system” (Magder 2003:31).  The truth of this 
statement is underlined by the fact that “the United States exports more media 
products to more places globally than does any other country” (Ekachai, Greer & 
Hinchcliff-Pelias 1999:146).   
However, global media outlets are still controlled by the same elites who held this 
power when the media was state centric. So, in essence, a small group of wealthy 
Westerners are controlling the flow of information for the majority of the world. 
And for the most part they still operate with the same fundamental goals in mind, 
simply carried over to the international scene. In other words, they are market-
driven businesses, which must adhere to the demands of a fast-paced and 
competitive media industry. Therefore, the global media is providing a bridge 
between the hegemonic state’s local issues and the consciousness and worldview 
of the rest of the planet (Silverstone 2002:107).  Thus, it seems clear that the 
entire non-Western world is receiving news that originates (at least partly) outside 
of its state borders and is disseminated through the filter of a major Western 
media corporation. It can thereby be inferred that this “news” arrives pre-
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packaged, accompanied by its own ideologies, assumptions and views about the 
world. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE MEDIA DURING THE TWO GULF WARS 
Initially, all twenty-one of our media sources were examined together to glean 
macro results about how the war in Iraq was framed.  Then they were broken 
down in specific ways in order to discern micro results. Firstly, we wanted to 
observe the way in which the US and, to a lesser extent, the other countries in the 
“Coalition of the Willing” tried to justify the invasion of Iraq.  Secondly, we 
wanted to examine the way the media of the world presented their news stories 
and how they framed them. 
These questions were primarily answered by examining the responses to the two 
questions, what is the cause of the problem and who is to blame.7  However, prior 
to examining the specific results of this most recent study it is useful to look at 
some of the findings from media studies of the first US-led invasion of Iraq in 
1991. 
In Wilhelm Kempf 's 1996 study of media content during the first Gulf War he 
found that the US-led coalition is blamed 38.8% of the time, while Iraq is blamed 
in 61.2% of the articles (Kempf 1996:4-5). Kempf found that the media primarily 
blamed Iraqi aggression as the cause of the war and that this explanation was 
rarely or never questioned. Iraq’s claim of having historical rights over Kuwait’s 
territory was often mentioned, but its credibility was usually doubted or denied. 
The media spent very little time trying to explore the possibility of the anti-Iraq 
coalition being motivated by the same selfish interests ascribed to Iraq. On the 
contrary, the press depicted the members of the coalition as acting with the main 
purpose of liberating Kuwait and only rarely was the alliance suspected of acting 
to secure a supply of oil and stabilize petroleum prices around the world. So, from 
these results it can be inferred that the US hegemon had a secure grip over the 
global public perception of the conflict. 
 
7 “Who is to blame” is divided into five categories: (1) US/UK and the “coalition of the willing”; (2) 
Iraq/Saddam Hussein; (3) Unwilling and active opposers [e.g. France, Russia, Germany, Canada] (4) 
UN i.e. the ineffectiveness or powerlessness of it; (5) Neutral/miscellaneous i.e. articles neutral in their 
views or blaming other nations or actors not mentioned above.  See previous footnote for 
categorisation of causes. 
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A similar study by Nohrstedt and Ottosen found the following attitude patterns 
towards main actors in the first Gulf War.  
TABLE 1. ATTITUDE PATTERNS TOWARDS MAIN ACTORS IN FIRST GULF WAR  
 
ACTORS 
% Positive % Negative % Balanced 
George Bush 20 4 76 
Saddam Hussein 4 34 62 
Mikhail Gorbachev 12 4 84 
John Major 13 0 87 
Francois Mitterand 8 8 84 
J. Perez de Cuellar 10 0 90 
Norman Schwarzkopf     40 1 58 
Bill Clinton 17 17 67 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000:192 
A conversion of the above table leaves us with an overwhelmingly positive 
attitude for the representatives of the 1991 anti-Iraqi coalition (total of 41 positive 
percentage points for its leaders, compared to just 12 negative), a positive attitude 
for the UN Secretary General (10 to 0), and a decidedly negative depiction of 
Iraq’s President (34 to 4). In general, Nohrstedt and Ottosen find that media in the 
first Gulf War never actually strayed too far away from the hegemon’s 
propaganda line. 
Nohrstedt and Ottosen suggest that “if the homeland of the media is involved in 
the conflict, news reporting is expected to function as a propaganda channel of the 
nation-state” (2000:250). However, there may be varying degrees of support for a 
conflict (from the media) depending on the significance that the conflict has for 
the nation in question. If the dominant superpower is an actor in the conflict, its 
propaganda is likely to find its way into news content and, by virtue of the power 
of the hegemon’s media, generally set the agenda for media around the globe. 
Thus, the dominant power’s propaganda is reiterated, wittingly or not, by all the 
rest. Nohrstedt and Ottosen also note that selective omission of events follows the 
same pattern of dependency on the hegemon’s interest (Ibid). The one thing that 
both of these studies seems to point to is that the US was able to “spin” the 
perception of the conflict around the world in its own terms and that the 
hegemon's power to define was alive and well. 
 34  
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These results are in stark contrast to those gathered from the study of media 
content prior to the most recent conflict in Iraq. Leading up to the United States' 
recent invasion of Iraq the US government attempted to frame the need for an 
invasion of Iraq in two ways.  One was the link the Bush administration tried to 
show between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction). 
The other was the connection between Iraq and the “War on Terror,” including 
implied links to Al-Quaeda, Osama Bin-Laden and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on 
the US.  The results in this recent study show that the media of the world 
(including the United States and its allies) actually used those two ways to frame 
their news very rarely, at 3% and 1% respectively (Chart 1).8 So, even though 
these two aspects were the main reasons that the US president and the Western-
based “Coalition of the Willing” gave for the invasion of Iraq, they were almost 
never discussed in the media. 
Instead, the world media was more apt to see the invasion and ensuing occupation 
linked to issues such as human rights abuses and US unilateralism.  In this way it 
is obvious that the US was not able to use their hegemonic power to convince the 
world to look at the conflict through their lens. In fact, the hegemon was often 
framed as the aggressor and as morally bankrupt. 
This study also investigated whether there was a decline in the ability of the US 
regime to both direct and deflect blame for the conflict away from themselves and 
towards other actors. The findings show quite clearly that while this was the case 
during the first Gulf War, it was certainly not the case this time. In fact even 
inside the US's own media, 21% of the stories blame the US and the Coalition of 
the Willing for the conflict in Iraq. This is more than the amount of blame put on 
the non-helpers (countries like France and Germany that opposed the war) at 17% 
and is only marginally higher than the 30% attributed to Iraq (chart 8). What can 
be deduced from this is that the US government was unable to set the agenda not 
only in the global media but also in its own back yard. 
The results of this blame game are even more illuminating when the entire world's 
media is taken into account. The global media, including the US and other 
coalition countries, blamed the US and the coalition in 45% of the stories, 
compared with Iraq at 17% (chart 3). Not surprisingly, the unwilling countries 
blamed the US in 56% of the stories and only blamed Iraq in 12% (chart 4). 
 
8 Statistical breakdowns of the media prior to the most recent Gulf War are presented in graph form at 
the end of the article.  
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Within the media of the “Coalition of the Willing”, countries who actually support 
the US in their case against Iraq, 40% of the articles put blame on the US, whereas 
Iraq is only blamed in 21% of the cases (chart 5).  The fact that Iraq is only 
blamed half as often as the US firstly suggests that the media within the coalition 
is not convinced by US attempts to frame Iraq as the problem. Secondly, it shows 
a trend in global public opinion going against the US, again showing that US 
credibility in the media and therefore inside civil society could be in decline. 
One major conclusion is clear from the results of this examination of the media. 
When compared to the studies of the last Iraq war an apparent decline in the US’s 
credibility is observed. This is clear because there has been a noticeable shift in 
the power of the US to define problems and attribute blame. Where in the first 
Gulf War Iraq was primarily blamed for the conflict, in this recent study it is the 
US that is primarily cast in a negative light. Also, and perhaps most important, the 
results suggest that there is dissent inside the US coalition and perhaps within the 
hegemon itself. 
 
ETHICAL VS. UNETHICAL HEGEMONS 
During the Cold War the US was cast in a competitive role against the other 
dominant hegemon of the time, the USSR. This meant that there was an inherent 
legitimacy or “rightness” to the US worldview as it was simply held up as a 
credible and logical alternative to global communism. This allowed the US to 
hold its subordinate blocs together simply by framing their positions as necessary 
to oppose the inherent wrongness of the “evil empire” (Mansbach 1994:414). This 
situation changed after the end of the Cold War as the US no longer had a natural 
enemy and their worldview had seemingly won out over the communist 
alternative. As Francis Fukuyama put it, the world had reached “the end of 
history” and the values of democracy and liberal-capitalism espoused by the West 
were now the only remaining legitimate worldview (Fukuyama 1992). This 
allowed the US and the Western democracies that made up the core of its 
hegemonic bloc to have a certain amount of leeway with the rest of the world. US 
common sense was assumed to be the path to development and progress around 
the world (Augelli & Murphy 1988: 125-140; Shaw 1994:11; Hallin 1994:59). 
The question that is to be posed at this time is whether or not that “honeymoon 
period” is over. It must now be asked whether the US has effectively acted as 
what Gramsci referred to as an ethical hegemon since the end of the Cold War. 
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However, before this question can be answered, a better understanding of the 
difference between ethical and unethical hegemonies is required. 
Gramsci describes an ethical hegemon as one that aspires and works to raise the 
subservient historic blocs under its control to its level (Augelli & Murphy 
1988:125-140). By this Gramsci means that the blocs that make up the hegemon’s 
power base must be lifted economically, politically and culturally to that of the 
elites. An unethical hegemon, in essence, is one that has failed to listen to the 
subservient blocs in global civil society. Thus, the dialogue between the hegemon 
and the blocs is one-way and top-down in nature. Gramsci says that if this 
happens, the blocs that have submitted to the hegemon, through discourse and 
compromise in civil society, begin to defect and reject the hegemon’s worldview. 
It is at this time that a hegemon can be considered to be unethical in nature (Ibid). 
To determine whether the US global hegemony is unethical or ethical is a 
subjective task at best. However, the simple fact that the economic and cultural 
disparity between the US and the majority of the world is growing, leads one to 
believe that a case could be made for the position that the US is in fact an 
unethical hegemon (McGrew 2000). 
Furthermore, the US has in the past stated that one of its goals was to maintain the 
economic disparity that exists in the world (Pilger 2003:120). Similarly, many of 
the international organizations and institutions that the US leads are often cited as 
helping to increase this gap between the US and the rest (Li 2001:51-57). These 
facts combine to make it a reasonable assumption that at least some of the blocs 
that make up the US hegemony may view their hegemon as unethical. It is only 
when the hegemon has been found to be unethical that a counterhegemony can 
potentially emerge (Downing 2001:15; Augelli & Murphy 1988:125).  
Conditions for an emerging counterhegemony are described as the point where 
historic blocs begin to defect from the hegemon and have the potential to come 
together in opposition to it (Ibid). At this time the defecting blocs will have to go 
through the same hegemonic process in state or global civil society where they 
suppress their micro goals and come together to focus on their common macro 
goal (Ibid). In this case that macro goal would be rising up and opposing the 
unethical hegemonic power of the US. The hegemon then has two choices: (1) it 
can make concessions and begin to listen to the subservient blocs, thereby 
assailing their concerns and reintroducing them into the hegemonic structure; or 
(2) it can ignore these demands. If the hegemon chooses to ignore them, the 
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subservient blocs will challenge the hegemon, who will in turn lose its power 
base.  
It has been suggested by some academics that the most likely time for structural 
change inside a system is during a time of crisis (Molotch & Lester 1974:235-
260). This is because during a crisis, events unfold unexpectedly and at too quick 
of a pace for the hegemon to adequately frame issues that are to be discussed in 
civil society (Ibid). The inability to adequately frame hegemonic discourse then 
leads to the emergence of more opposing views, which in turn diminishes the 
hegemon’s power to define (Hallin 1994:55). If this is the case, then this 
dissenting discourse should be observable inside the media during a time of crisis 
or conflict. It could be argued that with the current global situation, where there 
are a number of unpopular US-led conflicts, we have reached this time of crisis.  
This fact, combined with the knowledge that the media is one of the primary tools 
for discourse inside civil society, links the emergence of dissent in the media to 
the emergence of counterhegemony or at the very least, the possible defection of 
historic blocs. The question then becomes whether or not we are seeing signs 
inside the global media, and elsewhere, that this defection is indeed beginning to 
take place. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As previously stated, the general purpose of this article is to apply Gramsci’s 
hegemonic theory to an empirical analysis of media content leading up to the 
recent invasion of Iraq. Because the media is an integral part of the public sphere, 
it is believed that a better understanding of the current dialogue going on in civil 
society could be achieved through this process. It is hoped that a comparative 
analysis of the media prior to the recent invasion of Iraq could allow for some 
speculation about the health of US global hegemony. In theory, one would assume 
that an effective hegemon would be able to dictate the parameters of a debate 
inside global civil society in terms that they choose. The general picture formed 
from this empirical study of the media, is that there were and are several debates 
surrounding the war. In essence, the fact that there was no global consensus 
suggests that the US was unable to control the discourse leading up to the war and 
frame the situation to its advantage. It is also significant to note that when 
compared to the first conflict in Iraq the onus of blame allocated inside the global 
media has shifted. Where in the first Gulf War it was Iraq who shouldered the 
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majority of the blame, during the recent invasion it was the US that was primarily 
determined to be culpable. This fact alone suggests that the credibility and 
therefore the hegemonic power of the US could be in decline. 
 
In short, the debate reflected in the media does not follow the agenda put forth by 
the US and its allies. The WMD debate, which the “Coalition of the Willing” used 
as a pretext to invade Iraq, is a non-issue even to the majority of the media from 
the coalition itself. Japan is the sole exception, which might have to do with 
Tokyo’s own WMD concerns about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
Surprisingly, the WMD issue matters much more to Al-Jazeera and Arab News 
than to the rest of the media, excluding the Japanese-based Daily Yomiuri. 
Proximity and refutations could play a role in their concern with the topic. The 
alleged links between Iraq and different terrorist groups, another key reason given 
by the US for the invasion, are outright dismissed by the media, even in the US. 
The human cost of the eventual war ranks seventh among the ten categories in the 
study. Despite the efforts of the Toronto Star, Arab News and African News, the 
casualties of the coming war do not get much attention in the media.   
The topical analysis of the media in the scope of this study seems to give credence 
to the hypothesis that the hegemon and its allies, despite commanding an enviable 
media influence, were not able to swing the debate towards “their” issues. The 
results seem to pose the question, could this be the beginning of the end of the 
hegemon’s power to define? 
The analysis of the blame assigned to the actors in the political drama preceding 
the war seems to be consistent with such a view. The “Coalition of the Willing” is 
deplored in half of the articles. The articles that either divide the blame more or 
less equally between all sides or remain neutral come in second place. Iraq comes 
third in this order, being blamed for the conflict only one third as many times the 
“Coalition of the Willing”. The “unwilling”, that is Germany, France, Russia and 
company are the target of scorn in just one-tenth of the articles. The United 
Nations seem to attract the least criticism (less than 4 percent, while being the 
topic of nearly three times more stories), which seems to confirm the hypothesis 
from the topical analysis: people around the world question the global sheriff  (the 
US) more than the world city hall in the form of the UN. 
While it is not surprising to see Arab News as the primary carrier for criticism of 
the “willing”, it is worth noting that the coalition is getting some of its toughest 
treatment from the American International Herald Tribune the Danish Politiken, 
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the Canadian Toronto Star and the Australian Canberra Times. With Politiken and 
Canberra Times published in member countries of the anti-Iraqi coalition, the 
results seem to point to a significant fault line both between and within the 
countries comprising the West. The results seem to say that the US-led coalition 
was unable to convince its own media, let alone that of the world, of the rightness 
of its invasion. 
The defection of the majority of the West seems even more interesting given the 
backdrop of the careful pronouncements in the media from Russia and China. 
While generally disapproving of the US-UK push for war, Izvestia and People’s 
Daily acknowledge, both tacitly and explicitly, that confronting the US openly 
would be a mistake. Calculations of economic and geopolitical factors colour the 
debate in these media in pragmatic shades. Given that both Russia and China had 
their own concerns, like issues of terrorism, oil prices and trade relations, it is not 
surprising that the media in those countries remained fairly balanced in their 
critique of the situation.  
When these empirical results are analysed through the lens of hegemonic theory, 
some intriguing assumptions and conclusions can be made. It can be said that 
there has been a significant shift in global public opinion against the US between 
the last Gulf War and the current invasion of Iraq. It has also been shown that the 
US is the primary global hegemon.  Next, the way the US uses the media to 
disseminate its own worldview has been explained. Furthermore, the appearance 
of dissenting global opinions inside the world media has been shown to be a 
reflection of the discourse going on inside global civil society. 
If this is in fact the case, then one can assume that this dissent inside civil society 
could be an early sign of historic blocs underneath the US hegemony beginning to 
defect. In other words, we could be witnessing the decay of US hegemonic power. 
This does not mean that this decay is in any way permanent or irreversible, but it 
does mean that more and more the US is being framed as an unethical hegemon. 
This fact, combined with the global crisis presented by the ongoing situation in 
Iraq, could be said to provide the conditions for the coming together of these 
defecting blocs. Further to this point it can be said that this coming together of 
historic blocs is one of the early signs of a cohesive counterhegemonic force. 
However, having said this there are still a number of variables that would have to 
occur for this counterhegemonic scenario to play itself out. Firstly, these 
dissenting blocs would have to come together and put their individual concerns 
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aside in favour of focusing on their shared macro goal (opposing the unethical 
hegemon). This in and of itself is a monumental task that is almost impossible to 
comprehend, but it is a necessary condition for a counterhegemonic movement. 
Gramsci envisioned this process on a state level but since it has been shown that 
there is a global hegemon, these same requirements would have to be met on a 
global scale. Secondly, the US would have to ignore these dissenting blocs and 
fail to usurp their concerns and make them their own, thereby disrupting the 
cohesiveness and effectiveness of the counterhegemonic movement. Even so, it 
can certainly be said that the conditions are ripe for the emergence of a 
counterhegemonic force to confront the US global dominance. Due to this 
situation the hegemon is now faced with a critical foreign policy choice. The US 
can either begin to listen to the concerns of the blocs that make up their hegemony 
or they can ignore these criticisms and undermine their own legitimacy and power 
in the process. If the US begins to fail in the arena of consensus making inside 
civil society, the inherent rightness of their worldview comes into question and 
the universality of American common sense is undermined. How to confront this 
crisis of authority is one of the most important choices that the world’s only 
superpower and ruling hegemon will. This choice will determine whether or not a 
counterhegemonic force will rise to power, or if the US will hold onto or tighten 
its grip on the world. 
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RESULTS INTERPRETATION CHARTS9
 
CHART 1. TOPICAL DISTRIBUTION OF ALL UNITS IN THE SAMPLE 
 
 
The World: What Is the Problem
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10%
3. US Imperialism
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4. Global Economy
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5. Domestic Spin
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6. Terrorism
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7. Coalition Building
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9. Human Cost
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1. WMD 2. UN 3. US Imperialism 4. Global Economy 5. Domestic Spin
6. Terrorism 7. Coalition Building 8. Technical Aspects 9. Human Cost 10. Misc.
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9 The source for charts 1-5 and chart 8 is the authors’ own empirical data. 
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CHART 2. TOPICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE NEWS FROM US-BASED MEDIA 
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CHART 3. BLAME DISTRIBUTION FROM THE TOTAL SAMPLE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The World (All Media): Who's to Blame?
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CHART 4. BLAME DISTRIBUTION - COUNTRIES OPPOSING THE US INTERVENTION 
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CHART 5. BLAME DISTRIBUTION FROM THE ‘COALITION OF THE WILLING’. 
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CHARTS 6 AND 7. BLAME DISTRIBUTION DURING GULF WAR 1991 
  
Who is to Blame, 1991? 
(Nohrstedt, 2000)
1. Coalition
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2. Iraq
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3. UN
0%
1. Coalition 2. Iraq 3. UN
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The World: Who's to blame,1991? (Kempf, 
1996)
1. Iraq
61%
2. Allies
39%
1. Iraq
2. Allies
Source: Kempf (1996)   Source: Nohrstedt (2000) 
 
CHART 8: BLAME DISTRIBUTION IN THE STORIES FROM US-BASED MEDIA. 
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